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THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
MADDEN V. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS
The spiraling cost of medical malpractice insurance, evidenced by
annual increases of nearly 486 percent,' accompanied by a dramatic
rise in the number of malpractice claims asserted,2 larger recoveries,3
and a significant decrease in the number of carriers offering professional
liability coverage4 have led to an undisputed crisis within the health
care profession. In an attempt to reduce the impact of these factors,
arbitration has, with increasing frequency, been substituted for a judi-
cial determination of malpractice disputes.
The California courts have consistently found arbitration to be a
favored method for the expeditious settlement of claims, 5 and have
upheld such provisions in a wide variety of settings.' The reticence of
the courts to allow artificial and deleterious obstructions to restrict the
growth of the arbitral process is reflective of a strong public policy.7
1. Butler, Arbitration: An Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 9 BEVERLY
HILLS B.J. 41 (Sept.-Oct. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Butler].
2. Currently, one out of every five physicians will be forced to defend against a
malpractice action during his or her career. Id. at 68.
3. Illustrative of the increase in the amount of damages recoverable in malpractice
actions is Niles v. City of San Raphael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974),
which resulted in a judgment of $4,025,000.
4. Nationally, fewer than twelve companies write over ninety percent of all physician
malpractice coverage. In early 1975, medical malpractice insurance coverage in South-
era California was available from only two carriers: CNA and Travelers. Since that
time, CNA has withdrawn completely from the professional liability field. Butler, supra
note 1, at 69-70.
5. Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 875, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74, 76 (1970).
6. Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1974) (collective bargaining agreements); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1972), aff'd, 414 U.S.
117 (1973) (agreement to arbitrate rights of employees arising out of a profit sharing
plan); Gear v. Webster, 258 Cal. App. 2d 57, 65 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1968) (disputes arising
under the Realtor's Code of Ethics); Straus v. North Hollywood Hosp., Inc., 150 Cal.
App. 2d 306, 309 P.2d 541 (1957) (arbitration applied to the ordinary transactions of
medical entities); Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 266 P.2d 143 (1954)
(disputes arising out of the opening of a bank account).
California now requires the arbitration of uninsured motorist claims. See CAL. INS.
CoDE ANN. § 11580.2(f) (West 1972).
7. The early common law courts did not favor arbitration, and greatly limited the
powers of arbitrators. But in recent times a great change in attitude and policy has
taken place. Arbitrations are now usually covered by statutory law, as they are in
California. Such statutes evidence a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations,
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Although there have been numerous and unambiguous expressions of
a judicial presumption in favor of arbitrability, 8 it was not until the
1965 decision of Doyle v. GiullucctP that it became clear that arbitra-
tion agreements would be valid when applied to medical malpractice
disputes.
In a unanimous opinion, the court in Doyle upheld the validity of
a contract between the father of an injured minor and the Ross-Loos
Medical Group which included a provision requiring the arbitration
of all tort and contract claims arising under the agreement. Chief
Justice Traynor observed that "[t]he arbitration provision in such con-
tracts is a reasonable restriction, for it does no more than specify a
forum for the settlement of disputes."'10 Doyle has been interpreted
as an unqualified endorsement of the right of a fiduciary to enter into
an agreement to arbitrate, rather than litigate, medical torts with an
insurer of group health services." Even though arbitration was judi-
cially accepted as a valid alternative to the adjudication of medical
malpractice claims, questions going to the scope of its application were
left unanswered.
Doyle was significantly reaffirmed under extreme factual circum-
stances by the California Supreme Court in Madden v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals."2 In Madden, the court was presented with the issue
which policy has frequently been approved and enforced by the courts.
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 183-84, 269 P.2d 156, 170
(1953), disapproved on other grounds in Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal. 2d
169, 363 P.2d 313, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1961).
No insurer authorized to provide professional liability coverage in California can refuse
to issue or renew insurance at rates which are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory
to persons in the health care profession solely on the grounds that such person has
entered into an arbitration agreement with his patients. See CAL. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 11588 (West Supp. 1977).
8. In Gear v. Webster, 258 Cal. App. 2d 57, 65 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1968), the court
stated:
A heavy presumption weighs the scales in favor of arbitrability; an order directing
arbitration should be granted "unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."
Id. at 61, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 257, quoting O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co., 59 Cal. 2d 482,
490, 381 P.2d 188, 194, 30 Cal. Rptr. 452, 458 (1963).
9. 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
10. Id. at 610, 401 P.2d at 3, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 699. In support of his view, Chief
Justice Traynor further discussed the judicial safeguards which surround the arbitral
process. See also CAL. Ci. PRoc. CODE §§ 1281.2, 1286.2, 1287, 1294 (West 1970).
It is additionally significant that Chief Justice Traynor found it unnecessary even to
mention possible adhesion contract issues.
11. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 123 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1975), vacated, 17
Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
/ 12. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
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of whether an agent, in contracting for group health services, had implied
authority to agree to the arbitration of all malpractice claims arising
under the agreement, and if such authority existed, whether the arbi-
tration provision was enforceable. With the court's affirmance of
both the enforceability of the arbitration provision and the agent's
authority to bind the principal, significant questions regarding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements between a health care provider
and a patient were answered.
In order to make group health plans available to state employees,
the Meyers-Geddes State Employee's Medical and Hospital Care Act":
authorized the Board of Administration of the State Employees Retire-
ment System14 (the Board) to enter into renewable one-year contracts
with carriers offering basic health plans."5 Madden, a state employee,
enrolled under a plan which was the result of a medical services con-
tract between the Board and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser)."
Included in the contract was a provision which allowed the Board to
amend its agreement with Kaiser without the knowledge or consent of
employee-beneficiaries.? 7
When Madden initially enrolled under the Kaiser Plan in 1965, it
did not contain a provision requiring arbitration for the settlement of
disputes. However, in April 1971, Kaiser mailed its annual brochure
to its subscribers which described the plan and stated that all claims
involving professional liability and personal injury would be submitted
to arbitration. Subsequently, on May 28, 1971, the Board and Kaiser
amended their contract to include a clause requiring the binding arbi-
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22751-22840 (West Supp. 1977).
14. The Board was created by the State Employees Retirement Act of 1945. CAL.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 20100-20107 (West Supp. 1977).
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 22774, 22790, 22793 (West Supp. 1977). The Act
provides that state employees may enroll under any health plan resulting from a con-
tract between the Board and the medical service carriers. Id. § 22810.
Although § 22793 clearly requires that all contracts negotiated by the Board contain
a grievance procedure in order to insure that the rights of the employee-beneficiaries
are protected, the Act neither expressly grants nor restricts the authority of the Board to
incorporate a provision requiring binding arbitration into any health care services con-
tract to which it is a party.
16. For a list of additional defendants, see note 19 infra.
17. The pertinent part of the provision stated that the agreement would be
subject to amendment . . . by mutual agreement between [Kaiser] and . . . [the]
Board without the consent or concurrence of the Members. By electing medical
and hospital coverage pursuant to this Agreement, or accepting benefits hereunder,
all Members ... agree to all terms, conditions and provisions hereof.
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d at 704, 552 P.2d at 1178, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 884-85 (emphasis added).
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tration of "any claim arising from the violation of a legal duty incident
to this Agreement."' 8
In August 1971, while Madden was undergoing a hysterectomy at
the Kaiser Hospital in Los Angeles, her bladder was perforated and
blood transfusions were required. As a result of these transfusions,
Madden contracted serum hepatitis.
Upon recovery, Madden filed a malpractice complaint against Kaiser
and several other defendants. 9 Kaiser moved to stay the action and
compel arbitration pursuant to the provision in its contract with the
Board. In opposition to this motion, Madden contended that arbitra-
tion should not be enforced because at the time of her surgery, she had
no knowledge of the provision.20 The trial court denied the motion.
Kaiser appealed,2' and the court of appeal reversed, upholding the
validity of the arbitration clause.22
In affirming the appellate court's decision, 2" the supreme court
analyzed three separate issues vital to a determination of the extent of
the utility of arbitration when applied to a contract between a health
care provider and a patient. First, did the Board, as agent for state
employees enrolled under the Kaiser plan, have the implied authority
to agree to the amendment requiring binding arbitration? This issue
takes on added significance when consideration is given to the large
18. Id., 552 P.2d at i181, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
19. In addition to Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and
Southern California Permanente Group (which contracted with Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan to provide the hospital and medical services required by its contract with the
Board), Angela Young, M.D., a surgeon associated with the Southern California Perma-
nente Group, California Transfusion Services and the American Red Cross were joined
as defendants. Id. at 702 n.1, 552 P.2d at 1178 n.1, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 883 n.1.
Defendants' California Transfusion Services and American Red Cross, who supplied
the blood to Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, did not claim to be covered by the arbitration
clause incorporated into the Kaiser plan, and therefore, were not parties to the appeal.
Id. at 705 n.3, 552 P.2d at 1181 n.3, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 885 n.3.
20. Madden had filed a declaration stating that because of an absence from work
caused by illness, she had not received the April, 1971, brochure and that she was
unaware of the amendment to the original contract between the Board and Kaiser. Id.
at 705, 552 P.2d at 1181, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
21. In addition, Kaiser appealed from the trial court's order of May 22, 1974, denying
a petition for reconsideration of the April 22, 1974 order. The supreme court held that
since the first order was "clearly appealable" under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294(a)
as an "order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration," a second appeal
would serve no purpose and would therefore receive no consideration. Id. at 705 n.4,
552 P.2d at 1181 n.4, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 885 n.4.
22. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 123 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1975), vacated, 17
Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
23. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882.
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number of persons covered by group medical plans. Second, was the
arbitration clause voidable as a contract of adhesion? Finally, did
the arbitration requirement violate the employee-beneficiaries' consti-
tutionally protected right to trial by jury?
I. IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD TO AGREE TO
THE ARBITRATION OF MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Pursuant to the provisions of the Meyers-Geddes Act, 4 the Board
is empowered to negotiate and enter into contracts designed to provide
state employees, and their dependents, with group health benefit plans.
25
When serving in this capacity, or when negotiating and enacting subse-
quent amendments to the original agreement, the Board acts as the
employee's agent.26 So long as the Board is acting within the scope
of its authority it will bind the participating employees under the basic
precepts of agency law.27
Given the agency relationship between the Board and Madden, the
California Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the
Board, by amending the Kaiser contract to include the arbitration
provision, had exceeded the bounds of its authority. In holding that
the Board did have the power to amend the arbitration agreement, the
court relied upon Civil Code section 2319, which authorizes a general
agent "[t]o do everything necessary or proper and usual, in the ordinary
course of business, for effecting the purpose of the agency. 28  The
critical question was whether arbitration was, in fact, a "proper and
usuar' means for effecting the purpose of the Board's agency; namely, to
facilitate the procurement of group health care plans.
In an earlier interpretation of section 2319, a California District Court
of Appeal in Meyers v. Stephens 9 held that a selling agent was "au-
24. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
25. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 22774, 22790, 22793 (West Supp. 1977).
26. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882.
When procuring the policy, obtaining applications of employees, taking payroll
deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured group, paying premiums and gen-
erally in doing whatever may serve to obtain and keep the insurance in force, em-
ployers act not as agents of the insurer but for their employees or for themselves.
Blos v. Banker's Life, Co., 133 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150-51, 283 P.2d 744, 746 (1955),
quoting Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 204 (1937).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2330 (West 1970). See also Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal. App.
2d 104, 112, 43 Cal. Rptr. 420, 427 (1965); Burgess v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 44
Cal. App. 2d 808, 819, 113 P.2d 298, 306 (1941).
Section 2330 has also been held to apply to the amendments of existing contracts.
See Gear v. Webster, 258 Cal. App. 2d 57, 65 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1968).
28. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2319 (West 1970).
29. 233 Cal. App. 2d 104, 43 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1965).
1977]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
thorized to do whatever is necessary and usual to carry out the purpose
of the agency, that is, the sale."3 0 The basic rationale of this opinion was
that any customary method may be resorted to if it is an effective means
of attaining the objectives for which the agency was created. 31  Con-
sistent with the rule in Meyers, the Madden court concluded that since
arbitration had become an accepted means of resolving medical mal-
practice disputes, "an agent empowered to negotiate a group medical
contract has the implied authority to agree to the inclusion of an arbi-
tration provision. '3 2  In addition, the supreme court commented that
[t]he agent today who consents to arbitration follows a "proper and
usual" practice "for effecting the purpose" of the agency; he merely
agrees that disputes arising under the contract be resolved by a com-
mon, expeditious and judicially favored method.
33
The court's conclusion that arbitration has become a customary
device for settling malpractice disputes, and therefore should be re-
garded as being "proper and usual" within the meaning of section 2319,
is supported by legislative enactment as well as by case law. This
is most clearly illustrated by section 1295 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,3 4 which sets forth mandatory language and form requirements
for arbitration clauses in medical services contracts in negligence dis-
putes. 5 Madden, then, must be construed as a continuing expression
30. Id. at 113, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
31. As to this point, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY is in accord. Section
35 states that "fujnless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes
authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably
necessary to accomplish it."
32. 17 Cal. 3d at 706, 552 P.2d at 1182, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
33. Id. at 707, 552 P.2d at 1183, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West Supp. 1977).
35. Id. Section 1295(b) requires that immediately before the signature line of the
individual contracting for medical services, the following must appear in at least ten-
point bold red type:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE
ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBI-
TRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.
It should be noted that the notice requirement of § 1295(b) does not conclusively
eliminate the possible invalidation of the contract. Circumstances existing at the time
the contract was executed may be such that adhesion contract principles will require
that the arbitration provision, if not the entire contract, be set aside. See note 70
infra and accompanying text.
In addition to California, eight other states have enacted legislation similar to § 1295:
ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 176(7)-(19) (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230 (West
Supp. 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A01 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 500.3051 (Supp. 1976); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1976);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101 (Purdon Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAW ANN.
§ 21-25B-1 (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE §§ 8-911-922 (Supp. 1976).
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of the favored position accorded arbitration vis h vis medical malpractice
disputes.
In terms of upholding an agent's authority to bind its principal to
arbitration, the Madden holding is consistent with the practices relat-
ing to collective bargaining agreements which involve factual circum-
stances similar to the Kaiser-Board negotiations. The authority of
union representatives to agree to arbitration is specifically recognized
by California law,36 and arbitration has become a customary method
of resolving labor disputes. 37  In referring to the beneficial application
of arbitration to labor-management conflicts, the court in Fire Fighters
Union v. City of Vallejo38 stated:
[B]ecause arbitration substitutes for economic warfare the peaceful
adjudication of disputes, and because controversy takes on ephemeral
shapes and unforeseeable forms, courts do not congeal arbitration pro-
visions into fixed molds but give them dynamic sweep.39
In substance, this is also indicative of contemporary federal policies
respecting arbitration.40
In noting the experience of the courts in dealing with arbitration
within the context of labor law, the Madden court indicated its refusal
to sacrifice "these thousands" of collective bargaining agreements "on
the altar of an exotic and arid legalism that in all these years has not
even occurred to the parties."'"
Of major importance to the issue of the Board's authority to agree
to binding arbitration was the supreme court's refusal to distinguish
between the facts present in Doyle and those in Madden.4" Doyle held
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (West 1972) states that an "agreement" for the
purposes of the California Arbitration Act, §§ 1280-1290, includes "agreements between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives." Id. (emphasis
added).
37. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
38. 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974).
39. Id. at 615, 526 P.2d at 975, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 511, quoting Butcher's Union Local
299 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 66 Cal. 2d 925, 938, 428 P.2d 849, 856, 59 Cal. Rptr. 713,
720 (1967).
40. "Federal policy favors the settlement of labor-management disputes by grievance
and arbitration mechanisms; this has been expressed by Congress in section 203(d) of
the Labor Management Relations Act." Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of
Teamsters No. 42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 892, 484 P.2d 1397, 1399, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 55 (1971).
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 708, 552 P.2d at 1184, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
42. The plaintiff in Madden sought to distinguish Doyle on the basis that the minor
in that case did not question the authority of her father to agree to the arbitration
provision until after the award had been rendered. In contrast, she raised her objec-
tions to the clause at the earliest point possible. The supreme court pointed out that
the result in Doyle was not dependent upon the failure of the minor to make a timely
1977]
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that the duty of a parent to provide for the care of his child implicitly
included the authority to bind the child to an arbitration clause included
in a medical services contract.43 Noting that both parent and agent
are fiduciaries, with limited powers and subject to rigid standards of
honesty and fair dealing,44 the court could find no persuasive reason
why the implied authority of an agent should differ from the rule ex-
pressed in Doyle.45 Expanding its previous holding, the court concluded
that "an agent or other fiduciary who contracts for medical treatment
on behalf of his beneficiary" possesses the authority to agree to a pro-
vision requiring that malpractice claims be submitted to binding arbi-
tration.40
This decision merely recognizes the need for a fiduciary to possess
sufficient bargaining flexibility to provide the principal with the best
health care plan available. Since arbitration clauses are becoming
common additions to medical services contracts, a restriction of a
fiduciary's power which excludes the authority to agree to arbitration
would greatly reduce the number, and possibly the quality, of plans
available to the principal.
A particularly significant factor included in the Madden decision
was that, even under the extreme factual setting,47 the contract bene-
ficiary was bound to the arbitration agreement without her express
knowledge or consent. Several cases have held that a principal will
be bound by amendments to a contract even if he or she does not have
knowledge or notice of the changes.48 The agreement between Kaiser
and the Board expressly stated that it was to be subject to amendment
without notice to the employee-member. Thus, under the prevailing
assertion of her objections, but had been decided solely on the fact that the minors
father, as a fiduciary, had acted within the scope of his authority. Id. at 709 n.10, 552
P.2d at 1184 n.10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 888 n.10.
43. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 610, 401 P.2d 1, 3, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699
(1965). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(d) (West Supp. 1977).
44. The standards to which an agent fiduciary is to be held will be less stringent than
that of a parent fiduciary. While the former will be held to a standard of high responsi-
bility and good faith, the latter will, in addition, be subject to the court's control of any
settlement or compromise of the minor's claim. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 372 (West
1973).
45. 17 Cal. 3d at 709, 552 P.2d at 1184, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Madden contended that she had not received the April 1971 brochure (which
mentioned for the first time the inclusion of the arbitration provision) because of her
absence from work. See note 20 supra.
48. See Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35,
100 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1972), aII'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Gear v. Webster, 258 Cal. App.
2d 57, 65 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1968).
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rule,49 the beneficiary's knowledge was not required in order to effectuate
a binding provision.
Briefs submitted amicus curiae suggested that the court fashion a
rule invalidating any arbitration provision in a group insurance policy
that purported to bind the beneficiary unless he or she had actual knowl-
edge of the provision's existence. Citing the impossibility of establish-
ing an orderly system of administration, the supreme court declined to
consider any such proposal.5 0
II. THE VALIDITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION;
AN ADHESION CONTRACT PERSPECTIVE
The contract of adhesion" provides a significant exception to the
rule that one who manifests assent to a contract is bound by its terms
and will not be heard to complain regarding provisions of which he
or she was not aware.52 Generally, courts will refuse to enforce the
provisions of an adhesion contract which purport to limit the duties
or liabilities of the party enjoying a superior bargaining position, unless
such terms are "conspicuous, plain and clear." 53 On this basis, Madden
claimed that the Kaiser contract was adhesory in that the arbitration
49. See cases cited note 48 supra.
50. 17 Cal. 3d at 709 n.l, 552 P.2d at 1184 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 888 n.11. The
court also pointed out that the proposed rule would be viable only if arbitration were
still considered an extraordinary remedial procedure, which is in direct conflict with the
view expressed by the court.
51. In defining a contract of adhesion, the supreme court in Steven v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) noted that
[t~he term [adhesion contract] refers to a standardized contract prepared entirely
by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due
to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party,
must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a "take it or leave it" basis,
without opportunity for bargaining and under such conditions that the "adherer"
cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agree-
ment.
Id. at 882, 377 P.2d at 297, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (citations omitted). See also Player
v. George M. Brewster & Son., Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154
(1971).
52. Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1970). See also Frame
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811
(1971), aff'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
53. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 182 (1962).
Further, the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973)
is in accord. Section 234 states that
[i]f a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.Id.
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clause was "inconspicuous, unexpected, and disrupt[ed] the members'
reasonable expectation that a malpractice claim [would] be adjudicated
by trial by jury."54
Courts presented with attempts to invalidate arbitration provisions
as adhesory have consistently upheld their validity. The court of
appeal in Federico v. Frick5 concluded that the disputed standard
union employment contract before it "may well be a contract of ad-
hesion," 56 but refused to declare that it was not within the purvue of
the California Arbitration Act,5 7 preferring to leave such a task to the
legislature. In a subsequent case, Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc.,5 8 the court was again faced with a strong challenge
to the validity of an arbitration clause based upon adhesion contract
arguments. After viewing the problem in terms of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the party occupying the weaker bargaining position," it
was determined that there had been no showing "that arbitration would
be contrary to the reasonable expectation of any party or that any loss
or unfair imposition would result." 0  The pivotal factor here is that
a clause requiring the submission of the dispute to arbitration does
not prejudice the claims of either party, but requires only that the
controversy be transferred in tact to another forum for settlement.
In contrast, the typical adhesion contract which is struck down as
unconscionable is characterized by a considerably stronger party"1 forc-
54. 17 Cal. 3d at 710, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
55. 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1970).
56. Id. at 875, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
57. CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE §§ 1280-1290 (West 1972).
58. 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
59. Analysis of the adhesory provision from the perspective of the weaker party had
become the customary test for determining the 'effects of its inclusion. As Professor
Kessler stated:
[C]ourts have to determine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately
expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's "calling," and to what ex-
tent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical
life situation.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thought About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
The rationale for the conventional expectations test is that the weaker party has either
been harmed or overreached. However, in cases such as Madden, in which the plaintiff
has arguably received certain benefits from the contested provision and can show no
significant prejudice, the test loses much of its appeal. This gives rise to the question
of whether the test has any validity when applied to arbitration clauses, since such provi-
sions are seldom considered to be prejudicial to either party.
60. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
61. The official comments to the Restatement of Contracts point out that the disparity
in bargaining power is not the only factor to be considered.
A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in
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ing the weaker party to adhere to its terms on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Professor Kessler, in his classic discourse on contracts of adhesion,62
stressed that this disparity in bargaining power, combined with the
weaker party's vague understanding of the agreement, is the key to
determining whether the agreement is, in fact, adhesory.63 The im-
portance of this status relationship is evident in all those cases in which
the court, believing the contract to be one of adhesion, refused to
enforce it. A clear example occurred in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co.,"' where the California Supreme Court invalidated the terms of
an insurance policy issued by the defendant through a machine located
in an airport terminal. The court based its decision on the theory
that since the insured had absolutely no bargaining power whatsoever,
the provisions of the contract must have been "conspicuous, plain and
clear" in order to be binding upon him.65
This oppressive relationship was found to be nonexistent in Madden.
The Kaiser plan was held to be the result of negotiations between parties
"possessing a parity of bargaining strength." 6  The Board, as repre-
sentative for those employees who enrolled under the plan, possessed
sufficient bargaining strength to elevate the employees' collective bar-
gaining power to the same level enjoyed by Kaiser. As a result of this
collectivity, the Board secured medical services for state employees on
more favorable terms than they could have obtained by bargaining
individually. 7  Accordingly, the arbitration provision was the product
of a legitimate bargaining process, rather than a term forced upon the
individual employee by Kaiser.
In support of her contention that the arbitration provision was part
of a contract of adhesion, Madden placed substantial reliance upon
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California.68 However, the court
found this case clearly inapposite.69 In Tunkl, the plaintiff, upon
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of
risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that
the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact
assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
REsTATEmENT (SEcoNrD) OF CONTRACTS, § 234, Comment d (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7,
1973).
62. Kessler, supra note 59.
63. Id. at 632.
64. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
65. Id. at 878, 377 P.2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
66. 17 Cal. 2d at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
67. Id.
68. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
69. 17 Cal. 3d at 712, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
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entering the University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center,
was required to sign a document setting forth "Conditions of Admis-
sion." Included in these conditions was a provision purporting to re-
lease the hospital and the Regents from all liability which might arise
out of the plaintiff's treatment.70 After viewing these terms in the
light of Tunkl's physical condition at the time he executed the release, 7
the court stated that "we cannot but conclude that the instant agree-
ment manifested the characteristics of the so-called adhesion con-
tract."'72  The crucial difference between the agreements involved
in Madden and Tunkl is that the contested provision in the former
case was designed neither to exculpate Kaiser nor to cause any partici-
pant in the plan to contract away any cause of action which might
accrue to him by reason of Kaiser's negligence. 3 Whereas Tunkl
contracted away his rights against the Regents and the hospital, Madden
merely joined in a stipulation as to a particular forum for the settlement
of any claims which might be made against Kaiser. In addition, the
physical condition of the plaintiff in Tunkl was such that he had no
realistic choice but to agree to the terms of the "Conditions of Admis-
sion." By contrast, the plaintiff in Madden had the opportunity to
select from among several plans offered by the Board 74 or to contract
individually for medical services.
Madden clearly indicates that an arbitration provision alone will not
invalidate a medical services contract for unconscionability, or as a
contract of adhesion.73 Since arbitration has no effect on the merits
70. The pertinent portions of the release were as follows:
In consideration of the hospital and allied services to be rendered and the rates
charged therefor, the patient or his 'legal representative agrees to and hereby re-
leases the Regents of the University of California, and the hospital from any and
all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts of omissions of its employees, if the
hospital has used due care in selecting its employees.
60 Cal. 2d at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34. (emphasis added).
71. At the time that Tunkl signed the release, he was in severe pain, under sedation
and was probably unable to read the terms of the agreement. Id. at 95 n.1, 383 P.2d at
442 n.1, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34 n.1.
72. Id. at 102, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
73. After considering the particular circumstances involved in Madden, the court
concluded that
the principles of adhesion contracts, as elucidated and applied in Tunkl and the
other cases we have cited, do not bar enforcement of terms of a negotiated con-
tract which neither limit the liability of the stronger party nor bear oppressively
upon the weaker.
17 Cal. 3d at 712, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
74. Id. Among the various plans offered by the Board were several which did not
include arbitration provisions.
75. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1295(e) provides that any contract for medical services
which complies with the mandatory form and language requirements of subdivisions (a),
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of any party's claim, a comparison with the traditional evils associated
with contracts of adhesion is simply inappropriate.
III. ARBITRATION AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
An argument frequently raised in opposition to the enforcement of
binding arbitration provisions is that group health care plans violate
the constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.7 Although article
I, section 16, of the California Constitution does declare that trial by
jury is an "inviolate right" which "shall be secured to all," it also pro-
vides that the parties to a civil action may waive their rights to a jury
trial by mutual consent "expressed as prescribed by statute."
In Harmon v. Hopkins,77 article I, section 1678 was held to have
delegated to the legislature the power to determine what acts or omis-
sions would deprive a litigant in a civil action of the right to trial by
jury. The legislature's expression of the manner by which trial by
jury can be effectively waived is found in section 631 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, that waiver will be
accomplished in the following manner:
(1) By failing to appear at the trial;
(2) By written consent filed with the clerk or judge;
(3) By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes or
docket;
(4) By failing to announce that a jury is required ....
(5) By failing to deposit with the clerk, or judge, a sum equal
to the amount of one day's jury fees payable under the law, as pro-
vided herein. 70
In terms of the effect on the statute, there is authority for the
proposition that a party may neither waive his right to a jury by impli-
cation80 nor be deprived of his right by any means other than those
set forth in section 631.81
When presented with the contention that section 631 provides an
exclusive enumeration of the means by which a party can waive his
(b) and (c) shall not be a contract of adhesion, unconscionable, or otherwise improper.
Since only health care service plan contracts are exempted from § 1295, the decision in
Madden resolves the last area of doubt concerning the enforceability and validity of
arbitration agreements.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
77. 116 Cal. App. 184, 2 P.2d 540 (1931).
78. At the time Harmon was decided, article I, § 16 was designated article I, § 7.
79. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631 (West Supp. 1977).
80. See Hayden v. Friedman, 190 Cal. App. 2d 409, 12 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961).
81. See Harmon v. Hopkins, 116 Cal. App. 184, 2 P.2d 540 (1931).
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right, the Madden court responded that "when the Legislature enacted
the specific language of the California Arbitration Act82 to govern
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, it did not require that such
agreements conform to section 631.1"8
The 'supreme court supported this position by noting that section
631 assumes that an action is pending before a court of law, and relates
only to the manner of waiver after the dispute has been submitted to
the judicial forum.8"
Arbitration and adjudication are separate and independent processes
which should not be burdened by interdependent regulations. A require-
ment that agreements falling under the California Arbitration Act be
in compliance with the terms of section 631 would serve to defeat the
principal purposes of arbitration: to reduce the congestion in the courts
and to obviate the delays of litigation. 8
The Madden court also discarded the argument that the terms of
an arbitration agreement should include an express waiver of the right
to have the dispute brought before a jury, stating that to "predicate the
legality of a consensual arbitration agreement upon the parties' express
waiver would be as artificial as it would be disastrous."8 6
A significant number8 7 of commercial and labor contracts incorporate
provisions requiring binding arbitration but do not include express
jury waivers. The courts when dealing with disputes arising from such
contracts, have not invalidated the arbitration clause because there had
been no express waiver. In Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of
Teamsters No. 428 the plaintiff-employer elected to settle a contract
dispute by suing on the contract, thereby ignoring the clause requiring
the submission of any such dispute to arbitration. Even though the
arbitration provision did not expressly waive the employer's right to a
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1290 (West Supp. 1977).
83. 17 Cal. 3d at 713, 552 P.2d at 1187, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The court, in noting that it is common knowledge that disputes settled by arbi-
tration are not resolved by juries, indicated that a party to an otherwise valid arbitration
provision could not entertain a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to a
jury on issues covered by the agreement. Since arbitration, by definition, excludes access
to a jury determination, an express waiver of the right to a jury trial would be, at best,
redundant. Id., 552 P.2d at 1189, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
87. The court in Madden commented that there are "literally thousands of commercial
and labor contracts which provide for arbitration but do not contain express waivers of
jury trial." Id. at 714, 552 P.2d at 1187, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
88. 4 Cal. 3d 888, 484 P.2d 1397, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1971).
[Vol. 10
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
jury trial s' the court unanimously affirmed the lower court's order to
compel arbitration.90
The Charles J. Rounds Co. and Madden courts' refusals to invalidate
arbitration provisions simply because no express waiver had been made,
reflects the reticence of the courts to interfere with the contractual free-
dom of the parties. It is clear that a party to an arbitration agreement
will be charged with the knowledge that by freely entering into such
an agreement he is sacrificing his right to have the case heard by a jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding in Madden is neither novel nor revolutionary. It is, in
actuality, merely the logical extension of the rules expressed in previously
decided cases. However, the supreme court's decision must be viewed
as a significant reaffirmation of the legitimacy of arbitration in health
care service plans. It signifies the highly favored position accorded
arbitration by the judiciary as a parallel and independent forum for
the settlement of disputes. The court could have chosen to invalidate
the arbitration provision on several appealing grounds yet refused to
do so even under the severe factual circumstances.
The benefits of arbitration are frequently overlooked by advocates
representing injured plaintiffs. Arbitration provides a speedy and less
expensive alternative to a jury trial for those persons whose injuries
are not commensurate with the expense and delay of adjudication.
Relatively informal procedures and liberal rules of evidence aid an
injured plaintiff in the presentation of his claim. Additionally, the
safeguards provided by the legislature in the California Arbitration Act
insure that the arbitral forum will be a fair, as well as viable, alternative
to trial by jury.
Arbitration is not a panacea. It cannot elimiate all malpractice
problems, but it can be effective in reducing their impact. A substantial
number of states in addition to California have recognized the utility
89. Id. at 891, 484 P.2d at 1398, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
90. Id. at 899, 484 P.2d at 1404, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 60. Although noted by the su-
preme court, the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly exempts health care service plans
from the requirement of subdivisions (a) and (b) that it contain an express statement
that the parties by signing this agreement waive their constitutional right to a jury or
court trial. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1295(f) (West Supp. 1977). Instead, the Health
and Safety Code only requires that "[i]f the plan utilizes arbitration to settle disputes,
the plan contracts shall set forth the type of disputes subject to arbitration, the process
to be utilized, and how it is to be initiated." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 1373(i) (West Supp. 1977). Therefore, it seems clear that a health care service plan
does not have to include an express waiver of a jury or court trial.
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of arbitration, and have enacted statutes which permit parties to agree,
in advance of a dispute, to submit all of their claims to binding arbitra-
tion.91 Several of these statutes apply exclusively to the arbitration
of medical malpractice disputes.9 2  In addition, arbitration provides
a means of dealing with the realities of the medical malpractice crisis
without resorting to full scale tort reform.
Robert C. Danner
91. Other states which permit such agreements are: Ala., ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 176(7)-
176(19) (Supp. 1975); Alas., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.43.220 (1973); Ariz., Awxz.
REv. STAT. §§ 12-1501 to -1511 (1956); Ark., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-501 to -510
(1962); Col., COL. CONsT. Art. XVIII, § 3 (1973); Conn., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1958); Del., DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975); Fla.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West Supp. 1977); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§
658-1 to -15 (1968); Ida., IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -910 (1948); Ill., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 10, § 101-102 (Smith-Hurd 1975); Ind., IND. CODE §§ 3-201 to -226 (1971); Kan.,
KAN. CrV. PRO. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-201 to -213 (Vernon 1964); La., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9-4201 to -4217 (West 1951); Me., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 1151-1155 (1965); Md.,
MD. CTS. & JUo. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1974); Mass., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-22 (1959); Mich., MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.5001 to .5035 (1962);
Minn., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.01 to .07 (West 1947); Nev., NEv. REv. STAT. §§
38.015 to .205 (1973); N.H., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541.1-542-10 (1955); N.J., N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to :24-11 (1952); N. Mex., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-9 to -3-31
(Supp. 1975); N.Y., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw §§ 7051-7514 (McKinney's 1963); N.C.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to -599.1 (1969); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-
to 15 (Page 1954); Ore., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.340 (1975); Pa., PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1-209 (1963); R.I., R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 10-3-1 to -20 (1970); S.D., S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1976); Tex., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 224 (Vernon 238-6 1973); Va., VA. CODE §§ 8-503 to -507 (1957); Wash., WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1961); Wis., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 298.01-.18
(1958); and, Wyo., Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1048.1-.21 (1959).
92. See note 35 supra.
